This installment on the Morgenthau Plan deals with its origin.
On July 6, 1944, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau spoke with President Roosevelt. He requested permission to go to France to evaluate plans for U.S. occupation currency. The President gave his permission and Morgenthau and his team departed for Europe on August 6. Harry Dexter White sat next to Morgenthau on the flight and according to Josiah DuBois they discussed getting reparations from Germany.
White had given Morgenthau a copy of a report on the current state of planning by the Washington Interdepartmental Foreign Economic Policy Committee. Morgenthau was shocked. He did not feel that it was punitive enough. On their arrival in Scotland they were briefed by Bernard Bernstein the financial adviser at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). Bernstein, a former Treasury lawyer is described by Morgenthau's son as, "My father's principal on-the-spot agent in the European theater of operations.”
Bernstein provided Morgenthau with a draft of the SHAEF Military Handbook for Germany. This handbook emphasized building up the German economy in order to prevent the army from being "bogged down in a morass of economic wreckage."
SHAEF’s financial section was staffed by Treasury officers at the direction of President Roosevelt. General Clay, the future military governor of the U.S. Zone in Germany, (1947–1949), complained that these officers “were either members of the Communist party or tended in that direction.” Clay commented that Bernstein was “very smart and energetic but is somewhat warped in his judgment of the problem as a whole."
On August 7, 1944 Morgenthau and his team met with General Eisenhower. Fred Smith of the Treasury commented that it was Eisenhower who inspired the Morgenthau Plan. His notes made immediately after the meeting record Eisenhower saying, “The ringleaders and the SS troops should be given the death penalty without question, but punishment should not end there.”
Morgenthau’s team stayed in Europe for over a week. They met with members of the European Advisory Commission, Winston Churchill, the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and several other government officials. Eden gave the impression that he supported Morgenthau’s approach.
Eden showed Morgenthau the minutes of the Teheran Conference, a meeting where Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed postwar issues. It demonstrated that Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin envisioned a stern postwar treatment of Germany.
When Morgenthau returned to the U.S. he met with Secretary of State Cordell Hull who appeared to be in agreement with Morgenthau’s plans. Morgenthau told Hull about the minutes of the Teheran Conference. Hull commented, "Henry, this is the first time I have heard this. I have never been permitted to see the minutes of the Teheran Conference.”
On 19 August Morgenthau met with the President. He informed the President that Prime Minister Churchill, Ambassador Winant and the Army all favored a policy of rebuilding Germany after the war. Morgenthau commented, "Nobody has been studying how to treat Germany roughly along the lines you wanted.” Obviously The two had discussed this matter on at least on previous occasion. This is significant because it contradicts the “Without much thought” assertion that will be described later.
Morgenthau recorded that the President stated “Give me thirty minutes with Churchill and I can correct this. We have got to be tough with Germany and I mean the German people not just the Nazis. We either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so they can't go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past.”
After this meeting Morgenthau formed a Treasury committee to draw up the details for the MP. On 21 August the President directed Secretary of War Stimson to speak with Morgenthau. On 23 August Stimson met with the President and discussed occupation policy. Morgenthau had lunch with the President on the 25th of August. Here Morgenthau provided the President a memorandum on his ideas for postwar planning and a copy of the SHAEF Military Handbook. Morgenthau requested that the President return the memo and Handbook but the President stated, "No. If you don't mind, I would like to keep it and read it tonight and then I will return it to you." That night the president carefully read through the Handbook and Morgenthau's memorandum according to Morgenthau. After lunch Roosevelt and Morgenthau visited the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson. Roosevelt said that the Germans should have simply a subsistence level of food. When he was asked if he wanted the German people to starve, he replied, "Why not?" It was at this meeting that the President proposed a cabinet committee to study the problem along the lines he had outlined.
That weekend Morgenthau left Washington on the same train as the President. They traveled to Hyde Park where they stayed overnight "all the while discussing his plan." When President Roosevelt sent Morgenthau a report from Office of Strategic Services chief William Donovan explained that most of prewar Europe’s farm machinery had been produced in Germany and that destroying German industry might force all Europeans to starve, “Morgenthau scrawled back, ‘I would like to say in the words of your son Johnny, 'So what?’"
The State Department’s James Riddleberger sent a memorandum claiming: if put into effect, it will bring about extensive and important changes in European economy as a whole. Germany is a deficit country in foodstuffs and it is doubtful if a plan of making Germany predominantly agricultural can be put into effect without the liquidation or emigration of x-millions of Germans. It was clearly obvious that the plan was impractical.
The President and Morgenthau spent the weekend of the second of September at Hyde Park. Here Morgenthau provided the President with the newest draft of his plan. One of the provisions Forced German labor outside Germany was included under Restitution and Reparation. Morgenthau recorded his impressions of this meeting in his presidential diary: "The President listened very closely and seemed to be in complete sympathy with what I was saying."
The cabinet committee met again on the afternoon of Wednesday, September 6, in the White House. After Morgenthau and Stimson had presented their views the President addressed most of his comments to Stimson, "reverting to his proposition. . . . that Germany could live happily and peacefully on soup from soup kitchens." Morgenthau requested a rehearing before the President and another full cabinet committee meeting was scheduled for the 9th of September. On 7 September the President met privately with Henry Morgenthau where they obviously discussed the plan. At this last cabinet committee meeting before the President departed for the Quebec Conference the president gave the impression that he had not made up his mind about the two opposing views on postwar policy.
The President left the White House that evening. He was accompanied by Secretary Morgenthau, He arrived at Highland, New York at 7:30 A.M. At this point Morgenthau left the train for his estate. The President continued on to Quebec.
In closing it is important to note that the president held 18 documented meetings dealing with the Morgenthau Plan. It is claimed that he read reports on the plan “very slowly and very carefully.” This is important in light of the fact that respected historian accept the excuse that the president initialed the plan “without much thought.”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aZJzNBpAVZ8
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